Why the world doesn’t recycle more nuclear waste

The world has a problem it doesn't want to admit out loud. Every year, nuclear reactors around the globe generate thousands of tons of spent fuel — a material that remains radioactive for thousands of years. At the same time, this very substance contains an enormous amount of energy that can theoretically be reused. It's like owning a gold mine and instead of exploring it, turning it into a landfill. The paradox of nuclear fuel recycling is that the technology to process it has existed for decades, yet most countries in the world don't do it on an industrial scale. Why? The answer is surprisingly complicated and goes far beyond pure physics.

Where the problem lies: economics instead of technology

When nuclear engineers talk about fuel recycling, they mean a process called reprocessing. Spent fuel goes to a factory, where it is chemically dissolved and then separated into components — uranium, plutonium, and other isotopes. Uranium can be reused in reactors, plutonium becomes fuel for special fast reactors, and the remaining fission products go to storage as final waste. This technology works. France has been doing it since the seventies. The British, Japanese, and Russians do it too. The problem is that the economics of this process are terrible.

Reprocessing is expensive — very expensive. A fuel reprocessing plant is not a small facility. It requires advanced equipment, high automation for safety reasons, and must be located in a place with the highest nuclear safety standards. The cost of building such a plant is a billion dollars, sometimes more. Add to that operating costs, highly skilled personnel, and it turns out that processing one ton of fuel can cost more than mining new uranium from deposits. This is key — fresh uranium is simply cheaper.

Natural uranium is abundant and cheap. Mining it from the earth, enriching it to the level needed for reactors, and producing new fuel are processes we have perfected. Competition in the uranium market is fierce, prices are low. Why then invest in expensive reprocessing if you can buy fresh fuel cheaper? For every rationally thinking reactor operator, the answer is obvious: why bother?

Politics and distrust: when institutions block innovation

Economics would be surmountable, however, if not for a second layer of the problem: politics and concerns about nuclear weapons proliferation. Here the matter becomes much more complex and touches the very foundations of international nuclear security.

Reprocessing generates plutonium. Plutonium can be used in reactors, but it can also be used to make nuclear weapons. The United States, which for decades considered itself the arbiter of global nuclear security, never liked this. In the seventies, the Carter administration issued a decree banning reprocessing in the United States — a decision that remains in force today. The justification was reasonable from the perspective of those times: if America, as the world's largest nuclear power, were to do reprocessing, then every other country would want to do it too, and then everyone would have access to plutonium.

This political stance had a huge impact on the global market. Countries that wanted to be on good terms with Washington avoided reprocessing. Only those less sensitive to international pressure — France, Russia, China — continued these programs. For Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries, which only recently entered the global nuclear energy supply chain, reprocessing was never even considered. Instead, spent fuel is sent to temporary storage facilities, waiting for a final solution.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tries to balance promoting nuclear energy while ensuring it won't be a source of weapons proliferation. This means that any country wanting to do reprocessing must go through a very rigorous assessment. For small European countries, where nuclear energy is already politically controversial, the additional regulatory complexity is the last thing they need.

Storage instead of recycling: a status quo that persists

The lack of reprocessing means that spent fuel must go somewhere. The solution adopted worldwide is storage — first in pools at reactors, then in specialized temporary storage facilities. This solution has its logic: spent fuel is less radioactive than fresh fuel because most of its energy has already been extracted. After decades of storage in a pool, the fuel can be moved to dry storage — usually in metal casks on the power plant grounds.

The problem is that temporary storage tends to become permanent. Countries that promised final solutions — usually in the form of deep geological repositories — never implement these plans. The United States had Yucca Mountain. Sweden has Forsmark. Finland has Onkalo. But only Finland has actually built and operates a final repository. The rest of the world is still waiting. Meanwhile, fuel accumulates.

In Poland, the situation is special. As a country that is only now building its first nuclear power plant, we don't yet have a problem with massive amounts of spent fuel. But when we do, we will have to make a decision: whether to send fuel abroad for reprocessing (which is possible through an agreement with countries that do it), or store it in the country? Both options have serious political and economic implications.

Technology waits, but business doesn't listen

What is intriguing is that reprocessing is not the only solution. There are also fast reactors — devices that can burn spent fuel directly, without prior processing. This technology has been known since the sixties. France had the Phénix fast reactor, which operated for forty years. Russia has several operating fast reactors. China is building new ones. But in the Western world, fast reactors are seen as exotic — a technology of the future that is always ten years away from commercialization.

Why? Again, it's about economics. Fast reactors are more expensive to build than water reactors, which make up the vast majority of the world's reactor fleet. There is no extensive operational experience in the West. There is no supply chain. There are no engineers who have worked with them throughout their careers. For a new nuclear project, choosing a fast reactor means increased risk, extended construction schedules, and higher capital costs. For an operator who simply wants to deliver cheap electricity, this is not an attractive option.

There are also transmutation reactors — concepts that could theoretically turn long-lived waste into something less problematic. But these are mainly research projects, still very far from commercialization. The Generation IV International Forum is working on these technologies, but everyone knows that commercial deployment is at least two decades in the future.

The French lesson: reprocessing works, but it costs

France is the exception that proves the rule here. The country that produces 70 percent of its electricity from nuclear energy has always treated reprocessing as part of its energy strategy. The La Hague plant processes fuel not only from French reactors, but also from reactors throughout Europe and Japan. This solution makes sense for France because the country is highly dependent on nuclear energy and wants to maximize resources.

But even France has problems. The La Hague plant is old — built in the seventies and eighties. Its modernization is expensive and time-consuming. France plans to build a new reprocessing plant, but this project is delayed and over budget. Electricity de France (EDF) must balance investments in new reactors, modernization of existing ones, and maintenance of reprocessing infrastructure. This is not an easy problem to solve.

Interestingly, even France doesn't reprocess all of its spent fuel. A significant portion remains in storage. Why? Because reprocessing makes economic sense only for a certain fraction of fuel. For fuel that is very rich in uranium, reprocessing pays off. For fuel that is already less rich, the costs may be higher than the benefits.

Poland at a crossroads: what to choose for the future?

For Poland, the issue of reprocessing is a matter for the future, but worth considering now. Poland is building the Polish Nuclear Power Plant (EJP) — Poland's first nuclear reactor, which should be commissioned in the second half of the twenties. It will be a PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor) type reactor, a technology that is standard in Europe. Spent fuel from this reactor will be a problem for future generations.

Poland has several options. First: send fuel to La Hague or to Russia (which is possible, but politically problematic). Second: store fuel in the country in specialized storage facilities, waiting for a final solution. Third: invest in its own reprocessing capabilities, which would be very costly and complicated for a country just beginning its nuclear energy adventure.

Realistically, Poland will store fuel. But that means we need to start thinking about a final repository. Finland showed that this is possible — Onkalo, a deep geological repository in granite, will store Finnish nuclear waste for millions of years. Poland should consider a similar solution, rather than hoping the problem will somehow resolve itself.

The future: will reprocessing finally pay off?

There are some signs that the situation may change. Uranium prices are rising, particularly in the context of growing interest in nuclear energy as a source of clean energy. If uranium prices rise fast enough, reprocessing could become more economically competitive. Additionally, new technologies — such as lower-temperature reprocessing or new separation methods — could reduce operating costs.

There is also the question of public opinion. More and more people understand that nuclear energy is essential to fighting climate change. In this context, reprocessing can be seen as part of responsible nuclear fuel management. Countries that invest in reprocessing can position themselves as leaders in sustainable nuclear energy.

But the fundamental problem remains: reprocessing is expensive, and fresh uranium is cheap. As long as this economic asymmetry doesn't change, most countries will continue to store rather than recycle. This is not a technical problem — it is an economic and political one. And those problems are much harder to solve than reactor physics.